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This latter set of work is more optimistic than the former about future productivity growth, but it accepts the slowdown as reflecting a true drop in the rate of economic growth. A separate explanation for the slowdown forwarded by several parties in varied forms (e.g., McAfee, 2011 and Mokyr 2014; Alloway, 2015; Byrne, Oliner, and Sichel 2015; Feldstein 2015; Hatzius and Dawsey 2015; Smith 2015) is that it is substantially illusory. The theme of these arguments is that true productivity growth since 2004 has not slowed as much as measured (or perhaps even accelerated), but recent productivity gains are not being reflected in the productivity statistics. That is, due to measurement problems, the new and better products of the past decade are for some reason not being captured in productivity metrics.
This mismeasurement could take one of two related forms in the data. One would occur if a smaller share of the utility that these products provide is embodied in their prices than was the case for products made before 2004. If this were true, measured output growth would slow even as total surplus growth continued apace. The second form of mismeasurement would occur if the products' price deflators were rising too fast (or falling too slowly) relative to their pre-2004 changes. This would understate quantity growth as backed out from nominal sales. The prima facie case for this assertion, which for brevity I refer to as the mismeasurement hypothesis, is plausible. Many of the fastest-diffusing technologies since 2004, like smartphones, online social networks, and downloadable media, involve consumption of products that are timeintensive but do not impose a large direct monetary cost on consumers. If one considers the total expenditure on such products to be both the monetary price and the value of time spent consuming them, a revealed preference argument would suggest they deliver substantial utility (Becker, 1965) . At the same time, the fact that they are not particularly expensive (at least relative to consumers' supposed interest in them) could result in a relatively modest portion of their delivered consumption benefit to be reflected in GDP.
In this study I explore the quantitative plausibility of the mismeasurement hypothesis.
One fact dominates the discussion: had the measured productivity slowdown not happened, measured GDP in 2015(Q3) would be, conservatively, $2.7 trillion (15.0%) higher than it is.
3 This is $8400 for every person or $21,900 for every household in the U.S. For the mismeasurement hypothesis to fully explain the productivity slowdown, the losses in measured incremental gains for new technologies would need to be at or around this level. To explain even a substantial fraction of the slowdown, current GDP measures must be missing hundreds of billions of dollars of incremental output (with no accompanying employment growth, moreover).
As I detail here, several patterns in the data, each looking at the mismeasurement hypothesis from different directions, pose challenges for the hypothesis.
The first pattern is that the productivity slowdown is not unique to the U.S. It has occurred with similar timing across at least two dozen other advanced economies. While measurement problems could possibly be correlated across these countries, more problematic for the hypothesis is that fact that the magnitude of the slowdown in a country (of which there is nontrivial variation) is unrelated to the relative size of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in the country's economy. This result obtains whether this "ICT intensity" is measured in consumption or production terms. It echoes other work (Cardarelli and Lusinyan 2015) showing variations in the slowdown across U.S. states are not related to state-level ICT intensity.
The second pattern comes from the research literature that has attempted to measure the consumer surplus of the internet. These efforts are based on the notion that many of the newer technologies that could create large surplus with little revenue require internet access, which makes purchase and use of such access a metric for the gains from such technologies. This offers a way to quantify the role mismeasurement might have in the measured productivity slowdown.
The results from this literature suggests this role is limited; most of the estimates of the value of internet-linked technologies are at least an order of magnitude smaller than the trillions of dollars of measured output lost to the slowdown. Even the largest, which explicitly accounts for the time people spend online and is computed with very generous assumptions about the value of that time, totals to about one-third of the missing output.
The third pattern is observed in the incremental output of industries that make and service ICT/digital technologies. If the mismeasurement hypothesis were to account entirely (or almost so) for the productivity slowdown, the implied change in real revenues of these industries would be five times their measured revenue change. Incremental real value added would have been six times the observed change, and true labor productivity in the industries would have risen 363% over 11 years. Even if measurement problems were to account for only one-third of the post-2004 missing GDP (recall that one-third is the largest estimate by some distance from the literature mentioned above), this would imply a true growth rate of these industries that is multiples of what was observed in the data.
The fourth pattern arises in the comparison of data on gross domestic income (GDI) and gross domestic product (GDP). Conceptually, these two are equal by an accounting identity.
However, they are never equivalent in measure because they are computed with different source data. Since 2004, GDI has outstripped GDP by an average of 0.4% of GDP per year. This pattern is consistent with workers being paid to produce goods that are being given away for free or are being sold at steep discounts, consistent with the mechanism behind the mismeasurement hypothesis. However, I show that GDI began to be larger than GDP in 1998-several years before the productivity slowdown and, indeed, in the midst of a well-documented productivity acceleration. Additionally, a breakdown of GDI by income type shows that GDI growth over the period has been driven by historically high capital income (e.g., corporate profits). Labor income has actually fallen. This is opposite the implication of a "workers paid to make products sold free" story.
I detail all of these patterns below, after starting with a computation of the missing output lost to the productivity slowdown. I view none of these four patterns in isolation as being dispositive about the plausibility of the mismeasurement hypothesis. Together, however, they pose challenges to the mismeasurement hypothesis's ability to explain a substantial part of the productivity slowdown.
Calculating the Missing Output
I first compute the implied lost output due to the productivity slowdown. Using quarterly labor productivity data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics for the entire nonfarm business sector, I calculate average quarterly productivity growth over four post-WW2 periods (period averages are inclusive of endpoint years) : 1947-1973, 1974-1994, 1995-2004, and 2004-2015(Q3) . Past research has shown that average productivity growth has inflection points at or around the transitions between the period, and work on both the most recent and prior productivity slowdowns (e.g., Byrne, Oliner, and Sichel 2013) has used these periods. Table 1 shows average productivity growth rates along with their annualized values for each period. As 5 is clear in the It is not immediately obvious if GDP is the correct base to apply the counterfactual growth to. The BLS labor productivity series I use applies to all nonfarm business activity. This leaves out farming-, government-, and household-related output, which jointly account for about one-quarter of GDP. Compounded out over the 43 quarters of the latter period, the deflator grew a cumulative 2.4% more than had it remained at its earlier trajectory. To the extent that this acceleration might reflect real output mismeasurement (and to be clear, the fact that it did accelerate does not imply that it shouldn't have), it would only explain about oneeighth of the measured slowdown.
If productivity growth systematically differed in these excluded sectors, 4 I use the U.S. Census 2015 estimates of a population of 321 million living in 123 million households.
the "lost" output could be smaller than 3.21 trillion per year (if labor productivity growth in the excluded activities didn't slow as much as in nonfarm business) or larger (if productivity in the excluded activities slowed more). As long as productivity growth did not actually accelerate in these excluded sectors-which seems a fair assumption-a very conservative estimate of lost output would apply the 17.8% slowdown only to the three-fourths of GDP that the labor productivity series covers directly. This lower bound implies at least $2.40 trillion of lost output.
Some additional data can refine this lower bound estimate. First, the BLS does compute a productivity series that adds the farming sector (which accounts for about 1% of GDP) to the set of covered industries. This series experienced an even larger productivity slowdown than the nonfarm business series, falling from an average growth per quarter of 0.741% over [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] to 0.328% for 2005-2015(Q3) . This implies an even larger amount of "missing" output-$3.5 trillion applied to GDP or a lower bound of about $2.6 trillion when applied only to the directly covered sectors. Second, I combined an unpublished BLS series of total economy aggregate hours through 2014(Q3) with the real GDP index from the BEA to compute a total economy labor productivity measure.
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Thus the amount of output lost to the productivity slowdown ranges somewhere between $2.4 trillion and $3.5 trillion per year. Going forward, I will analyze the case for the mismeasurement hypothesis using the $2.7 trillion value implied by the "whole economy" productivity metric just discussed. This is conservative in the sense that it leaves less total lost output for the hypothesis to explain than would applying the BLS measured productivity slowdown to all of GDP. 
The Extent of the Productivity Slowdown Is Not Related to Digital Technology Intensity
Before addressing the quantitative plausibility of the mismeasurement hypothesis in U.S.
data, I first zoom out to look at patterns across countries. Several studies have noted recent productivity slowdowns in other economically advanced countries (e.g., Mas and Stehrer, 2012; Connolly and Gustafsson, 2013; Pessoa and Van Reenen, 2014; Goodridge, Haskel, and Wallis, 2015) . Furthermore, Cette, Fernald, and Mojon (2015) document that, as in the U.S., these slowdowns began before the 2008-09 financial crisis and recession.
Given the relatively technology-heavy profile of U.S. production (and citation of digital technologies produced by U.S.-based multinationals as prime examples of the sources of mismeasurement), one might argue that the fact that a productivity slowdown has occurred across a number of economies makes a measurement-based explanation for the slowdown less likely. Still, it could be that similar measurement problems have arisen in multiple countries. To more directly test whether technology-linked mismeasurement is behind the multiple slowdowns, I test if there is any systematic relationship between the extent of a slowdown in a country and the importance of ICTs, whether on the production or consumption side, to that country's economy.
I conduct this test using OECD labor productivity growth data, which contains yearly unusually weak productivity growth-these were the only two years with negative average productivity growth across the sample-the slowdown does not merely reflect the crisis years.
Calculating later-period average productivity growth excluding 2008-09 still reveals slowdowns in measured productivity growth in 25 of 30 countries, with an average drop of 0.72% per year (from 2.58% to 1.86%). Similarly, computing the prior period average productivity growth using only 1996-2004 data in order to allow for an expanded sample returns the same results:
productivity growth slows between the periods in 33 of 35 countries (the exceptions being Spain and Russia).
As for the covariance between the size of a country's slowdown and its ICT intensity, Similar results obtain both qualitatively and quantitatively if I instead measure the productivity slowdown using later-period growth rates that exclude 2008-09 or the larger sample with 1996-2004 as the early period. This is not surprising given that the correlations between the three productivity slowdown measures are all above 0.9.
Thus the productivity slowdown is not unique to the U.S., but rather has occurred in at least two dozen advanced economies. More directly leaning against the mismeasurement hypothesis is the fact that the size of the slowdown in a country is not systematically related to measures of the intensity of ICT-related technologies consumption or production in that country.
These results echo and complement the findings in Cardarelli and Lusinyan (2015) , who show differences in the slowdown in total factor productivity growth across U.S. states are uncorrelated with measures of states' ICT intensities, both as inputs and outputs in production.
Estimates of Internet-Linked Technologies' Surplus from the Research Literature
To examine the quantitative plausibility of the measurement hypothesis in more detail, I Applying their theoretical framework to data, they find that the consumer surplus of internet access could be as large as 3% of full income (the sum of actual income and the value of leisure time). This surplus would be $3000 annually for the median person in their dataset.
Brynjolfsson and Oh (2012) extended this analysis with updated data. They pay particular 10 They also use their estimates to infer the total surplus (revenues plus consumer surplus) of access to 1 Gb/s networks, which is currently unavailable in most locations. This extrapolation implies a total surplus of $3350 per year. Some of this would surely be captured as revenues of downstream firms and thus measured in GDP. A conservative price for this service would be $900 per year, so consumer surplus per household would be around $2450. Even if product were obtained by every household in the country that has broadband, this adds up to $241 billion of consumer surplus, 9% of $2.7 trillion.
attention to incremental gains from free internet services, valuing these at over $100 billion (about $320 per capita) annually.
To 
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The Goolsbee-Klenow time-based estimate is by far the highest valuation of the internet in the literature, essentially an order of magnitude larger than the other estimates. I constructed it using very expansive assumptions about the value of leisure time. And yet it is still less than onethird the $2.7 trillion of lost income from the productivity slowdown.
Most of the technologies cited by proponents of the mismeasurement hypothesis require internet access of some sort, so these estimates of the surplus delivered by that gateway should 11 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics employment data, average pre-tax hourly earnings for all nonfarm private business employees were $25.08 over the third quarter of 2015. To impute an after-tax wage, I multiply this value by the ratio of that quarter's disposable personal income ($13.51 trillion) to total pre-tax personal income ($15.47 trillion), an average tax rate of 12.7%. embody the surplus of the technologies that are not priced on the margin. Nevertheless, it is possible that some post-2004 technologies that deliver a high ratio of consumer surplus to revenue do not require internet access and as such would not be valued in the aforementioned estimates. The numbers above indicate, however, that to quantitatively explain the bulk of the productivity slowdown, these products would need to deliver surplus that is both somehow not priced either directly or through complementary goods and services, and that is as large as or larger than the biggest estimates of the surplus of internet-linked products. publishing (including software), except internet; motion picture and sound recording;
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broadcasting and telecommunications; and data processing, internet publishing, and other information services. To the point above about the internet as an access portal, both internet service providers and mobile telephony carriers are in this sector (in particular, NAICS 517, telecommunications).
These industries comprise the segments of the economy most likely to produce the technologies that are the focus of claims of the mismeasurement hypothesis. They also doubtlessly contain activity that has not seen considerable technological expansion over the past decade (or even the past couple of decades, for that matter). As will be clear, this over-expansive definition of the output tied to the mismeasurement hypothesis is conservative in the sense that it will tend to overestimate the missing output these industries might account for. Looking at the dual to this calculation-that is, through the lens of a price deflator-is also instructive. The Tornqvist value added price index for the industry bundle fell 13.2% over 2004-2014, a CAGR of -1.4%. If real GDP growth has been misstated because deflators have improperly accounted for quality changes in these products, the true deflator would be that which raises measured real value added growth by the extra $2.7 trillion. This deflator would have a CAGR of -9.3% (sustained over 11 years)-seven times the magnitude of the actual deflator.
Prices would have fallen not by 15% since the slowdown began but 65% instead.
Some of the industries' outputs are intermediate inputs used to make other products.
Therefore they do not directly deliver surplus to final demanders. It is possible that some of the gains from the new technologies might arise as (again mismeasured) productivity gains in the production of goods for which they are used as inputs. If this were the case, the total "multiplier" effect of technological progress through input use is captured by the industry's ratio of gross output (revenues) to value added (Domar, 1961; Hulten, 1978) . Incremental revenues capture the gains associated not just with the industry's products per se but also any embodied productivity gains obtained through their use as inputs. To gauge the potential influence of this usage, I repeat the calculations above using revenues (gross output) in place of value added.
Incremental real gross output (i.e., real revenue) for the industries was therefore about A final set of calculations reinforces this point. If the data miss industry output growth, they of course also miss productivity growth. In this case, that is a lot of missing productivity.
These industries, combined, saw their total employment rise 3.6% over 2004-2015 (from 5.58 million to 5.78 million, about 0.3% annually). Assuming they actually produced all of the output lost to the productivity slowdown, real value added per worker, properly measured, would have risen by 363% over those 11 years. This is an astounding rate of productivity growth. For example, it is notably larger than the 83% productivity growth seen in durable goods manufacturing during the productivity acceleration of 1995 to 2004, when durables had the fastest labor productivity growth of any major sector and they were a primary driver of the acceleration (Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh, 2007) .
Perhaps these numbers are not that surprising when one considers that these digitaltechnology industries accounted for only 7.7% of GDP in 2004. A full accounting of the productivity slowdown by the mismeasurement hypothesis requires this modest share of economic activity to account for lost incremental output that in 2015 is about 15% of GDPtwice the 2004 size of the entire sector. One should be mindful that it is possible that unmeasured incremental gains are being made in industries outside these. However, balancing this out is the fact that, as discussed above, the digital-product-focused industries here are defined expansively.
It is doubtful that every segment in this grouping has experienced rapid technological progress.
National Income versus National Product
In national income accounting, gross domestic income-the sum of employee compensation, net operating surplus, net taxes on production and imports, and consumption of fixed capital (i.e., depreciation)-equals GDP by an identity. These are never equal in practice, however, because different data are used to construct each-income information on the one hand and expenditure data on the other.
In recent years, the gap between GDI and GDP-the so-called "statistical discrepancy"-has widened, with GDI on average outpacing GDP. Table 2 shows GDI, GDP, and the gap between them in annual data for 1995-2014. 15 A closer examination of the data, however, strongly suggests that the GDI-GDP gap is not a sign of mismeasurement hypothesis.
Over 2005-14, a cumulative gap of $650 billion (nominal) grew between GDI and GDP. This is an average gap of about 0.4% of GDP per year, though not every single year saw domestic income exceed domestic product. One could argue that this gap reflects workers being paid to make products (whose labor earnings are included in GDI) that are being given away for free or at highly discounted prices relative to their value (reducing measured expenditures on these products and therefore GDP in turn). This would be an incidental indicator of the forces surmised by the mismeasurement hypothesis.
First, as is clear in the table, the gap started opening before the productivity slowdown.
GDI was larger than GDP in each of the seven years running from 1998 to 2004, all of which were a time of fast productivity growth. The average annual gap was 0.6% of GDP, even larger than in the slowdown period.
Second, a closer look at the composition of national income reveals patterns inconsistent with the "workers paid for making free products" story. The four rightmost columns in Table 2 follow the evolution of the shares of GDI paid to each of the four major income categories that comprise it. Between 2004 and 2014, employee compensation's share of GDI fell by 2.2 percentage points while gross operating surplus grew by 1.6 percentage points. Net taxes' share fell by 0.1 percentage point and depreciation rose by 0.7 percentage points. Thus the GDI gains over the period were tied to payments to capital that came at the expense of labor income.
16 15 The BEA defines the statistical discrepancy as GDP minus GDI, so a negative reported value implies that GDI is larger than GDP. As I am focusing on the extent to which GDI is greater than GDP, I am discussing the behavior of the negative of the statistical discrepancy.
Nor 16 These income share changes are a reflection of the trends that other researchers (e.g., Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin 2013 and Karabarbounis and Neiman 2014) have been exploring in other contexts. An alternative decomposition of income yields the same implications as those described here. This alternative divides national income (gross domestic income adjusted for international transfers minus depreciation) into employee compensation, proprietor's income, capital income (the sum of rental income, corporate profits, and net interest), and a residual category that is the sum of net taxes on production and imports plus business transfer payments plus the surplus of government enterprises. As with the results above, labor's share fell as capital's share rose over 2004-14. Employee compensation's share of national income fell by 2.6 percentage points while capital income grew by 2.9 percentage 18 is this link between GDI and capital income only manifested in long differences; the correlation in annual data from 1995 to 2014 between the GDI-GDP gap and labor's share is -0.43, while it is 0.67 for net operating surplus.
Growth in domestic income measures relative to measured domestic product therefore seems to reflect increases in capital income rather than labor income. "Abnormally" high measured income relative to measured expenditures is positively related to growth in businesses' profitability and negatively related to payments to employees. This is inconsistent with-and indeed implies the opposite of-the "pay people to build free goods" story.
Conclusion
In this note I have evaluated the argument that the decade-long slowdown in labor productivity growth is at least in part illusory, and instead is the consequence of measurement issues. Under this line of reasoning, which I term the mismeasurement hypothesis, true productivity growth has not slowed (or slowed considerably less than measured) since 2004, but recent gains have not been reflected in productivity statistics, either because new goods' total surplus has shifted from (measured) revenues to (unmeasured) consumer surplus, or because price indices are overstated.
My evaluation offers four pieces of evidence that pose challenges for the mismeasurement hypothesis. First, the productivity slowdown has occurred in dozens of advanced economies, and its magnitude is not related to measures of those economies' intensities of digital technology consumption or production. Second, estimates from previous research of the consumer surplus of internet access-which presumably embodies a large portion of the surplus created by the new technologies claimed by proponents of the hypothesis-are far from the missing $2.7 trillion (conservatively speaking) of GDP lost to the productivity slowdown.
The largest estimate by some distance, measured using very generous definitions of the value of leisure time, is less than one-third this amount. Third, for measurement problems to fully account for the lost output resulting from the productivity slowdown, the true real revenue growth rate of industries that produce and service information and communication technologies would have to be four times its measured growth rate (true value added growth would be five times its points. (Proprietors' income share fell by 0.2 percentage points and the share of taxes fell by 0.1 percentage point over the period.) measured level. Even if these industries were supposed to only account for a substantial sharethough not most-of the lost output (say the one-third implied by the largest estimate of surplus from the literature), it would still be the case that in absence of measurement problems, real output growth would have to be multiples of their observed growth in the data. These implications reflect the fact that the productivity slowdown caused measured GDP to fall by 15% of its counterfactual level, yet digital technology industries-which presumably are the source of most measurement problems arising since 2004-were only 7.7% of GDP in 2004. Fourth, while measured gross domestic income has been on average higher than gross domestic product since 2004-perhaps indicating workers are being paid to produce products that are given away for free or highly discounted prices-this trend actually began before the productivity slowdown.
Even more problematically for the hypothesis, the widening of this gap appears to reflect unusually high capital income rather than labor income.
In summary, multiple basic patterns in the data pose challenges for mismeasurement based explanations for the productivity slowdown that the U.S. has been experiencing since These results are suggestive. They do not definitively rule out the possibility that productivity measurement problems may have developed over the past decade for specific products or product classes. However, the combined weight of the patterns presented here makes clear that the intuitive and plausible empirical case for the mismeasurement hypothesis faces a higher bar in the data, at least in terms of its ability to account for a substantial portion of the measured output lost to the productivity slowdown. It also suggests that, more likely than not, 20 much if not most of the productivity slowdown is real. 17 Whether that slowdown will end anytime soon is an open question. 17 One very speculative mechanism that would tie a true productivity slowdown to people spending a large share of their time on zero-to-low-marginal-price technologies would be if workers substituted work effort for technology consumption (e.g., spending time at work on social networking sites) after 2004. This would heighten consumer surplus in a way largely unmeasured by standard statistics while at the same time reducing output per hour-that is, measured labor productivity. Of course, to explain a slowdown in labor productivity growth, this substitution would need to be occurring in ever greater magnitudes over time. 
